Let the Magistrates Revolt: A Review of Search Warrant Applications for Electronic Information Possessed by Online Services by Day, Reid
 
491 
Let the Magistrates Revolt: A Review of Search 
Warrant Applications for Electronic Information 
Possessed by Online Services 
Reid Day* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every day, millions of Americans send and receive email, update 
social media statuses, post blogs, and otherwise enjoy Internet services 
that enrich their lives in countless ways.  These Internet users are 
increasingly aware that the companies providing their beloved Internet 
services maintain records about customers’ activity online.
1
  While some 
Americans are ambivalent about the decrease of privacy online, many 
Americans consider privacy important and struggle to understand the 
changing online privacy landscape.
2
  It is difficult to know how much 
data is collected online and how that information is used.
3
  An 
astonishingly revealing trail of digital information results from 
synthesizing records about every email, Facebook post, or tweet.
4
  That 
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 1.  Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and 
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-
attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/. 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Online Tracking and Behavioral Profiling, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online_tracking_and_behavioral.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); 
see also Privacy and Consumer Profiling, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
https://epic.org/privacy/profiling/default.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (discussing types of data 
collected and data collectors).  
 4.  See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Here’s a Tool to See What Your Email Metadata Reveals About 
You, FORBES (July 10, 2013, 2:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/10/heres-
a-tool-to-see-what-your-email-metadata-reveals-about-you/ (discussing amount of data stored in 
metadata that many do not know exists); Elizabeth Dwoskin, In a Single Tweet, as Many Pieces of 
Metadata as There Are Characters, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (June 6, 2014, 4:46 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/06/06/in-a-single-tweet-as-many-pieces-of-metadata-as-there-are-
characters/ (explaining that a single 140 character Tweet contains “150 separate points of so-called 
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Unfortunately, criminals also utilize the wide range of services 
offered by Internet companies to facilitate criminal activities.  Internet 
services provide a quick way to share information and organize criminal 
activity, allowing a user to create an account by only providing basic 
information such as a username and password.
6
  Though a criminal may 
provide a fake name or address, the digital information generated from 
the criminal’s online activity is more difficult to manipulate and can 
reveal personal details including, with the help of an Internet Service 
Provider, a user’s physical location.
7
  Understandably, investigators are 
interested in obtaining digital information that paints a detailed picture of 
an individual’s daily activities.
8
  As a result, Apple, Google, and other 
online services are quickly becoming a go-to source for law-enforcement 
investigations.
9
  The amount and type of information gathered from 
searching and seizing an entire online account is invaluable to 
government investigators because that information tells a precise and 
objective story about the user’s activity online and offline.  An 
investigator can piece together a compelling theory of a crime by 
searching an email or social media account and finding information 
pertaining to an individual’s activity.
10
 
Government investigators obtain electronic information in a number 
                                                          
metadata”).   
 5.  E.g., Nate Anderson, Why Google Keeps Your Data Forever, Tracks You with Ads, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 8, 2010, 8:20 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/03/google-keeps-your-
data-to-learn-from-good-guys-fight-off-bad-guys/.   
 6.  The website Fake Name Generator, for instance, automatically creates a false e-mail 
address and a completely false identity to go along with it, including name, age, address, and height. 
FAKE NAME GENERATOR, www.fakenamegenerator.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2015).  
 7.  Cale Guthrie Weissman, What Is an IP Address and What Can It Reveal About You?, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ip-address-what-they-
can-reveal-about-you-2015-5.   
 8.  See G.W. Schulz & Daniel Zwerdling, Easily Obtained Subpoenas Turn Your Personal 
Information Against You, THE CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://cironline.org/reports/easily-obtained-subpoenas-turn-your-personal-information-against-you-
5104 (explaining various ways that investigators can gather electronic information with relative 
ease). 
 9.  See Tim Cushing, Judge John Facciola on Today’s Law Enforcement: I’d Go Weeks 
Without Seeing a Warrant for Anything ‘Tactile’, TECHDIRT (Mar. 3, 2015, 2:34 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150221/13433030098/judge-john-facciola-todays-law-
enforcement-id-go-weeks-without-seeing-warrant-anything-tactile.shtml (describing law 
enforcement’s preference for digital searches rather than tactile searches).   
 10.  See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the 
Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3–6 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing the government’s request 
to compel Facebook to disclose an entire account belonging to the alleged shooter in a 2013 incident 
at Washington, D.C.’s Navy Yard facility).   
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of ways.
11
  This Comment focuses on investigations where a warrant is 
sought to compel the company providing an Internet service to disclose 
the records of an individual user.  Investigators rely on a two-step 
process from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41 that is 
specifically designed for this purpose.  A lack of guidance regarding 
limits on the type and amount of electronic information that government 
investigators can compel an Internet service provider to disclose leads to 
Rule 41’s use as a tool to obtain the entirety of an individual’s activity on 
a particular online service. 
Although government investigations necessarily must seek electronic 
data to effectively fight crime, the Fourth Amendment must protect the 
vast amount of electronic information generated by Internet users.  The 
data generated from our online activities must be protected because it 
reveals the innermost private and intimate aspects of our lives.
12
  But the 
law today is murky, confusing, and outdated.
13
  While not always 
statutorily required, a warrant is increasingly required in federal 
investigations.
14
  The problem becomes not whether the government 
must seek a warrant in a particular investigation, but whether the 
government’s warrant application for electronic information using Rule 
41’s two-step process ensures Americans are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment in today’s digital world.  When law enforcement utilizes 
Rule 41’s two-step process, the search warrant applications are often 
overbroad and lacking specificity.
15
  As a result, a Fourth Amendment 
violation can occur if the government exceeds the scope of the search 
warrant or indefinitely retains electronic data to conduct searches not 
covered by the original search warrant.
16
 
                                                          
 11.  See Theodoric Meyer, No Warrant, No Problem: How the Government Can Get Your 
Digital Data, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2014, 10:29 AM), https://www.propublica.org/special/no-
warrant-no-problem-how-the-government-can-still-get-your-digital-data (explaining the ways in 
which investigators can retrieve electronic information, including ways investigators can get the 
information without going through the normal warrant process).   
 12.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citing Rios v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 253, 260–61(1960); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877))); Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014) (discussing the immense storage capacity of modern 
cell phones, which implicates privacy concerns with regard to the extent of information that could be 
accessed on the cell phone).   
 13.  See infra Part II.B.1.   
 14.  See infra Part II.B.2.   
 15.  See, e.g., In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@Gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The search warrant directs 
Google to provide to the Government ‘all content and other information within the Provider’s 
possession, custody, or control associated with’ the email account . . . .”).   
 16.  See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th 
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To ensure that Americans’ Fourth Amendment rights are protected, 
Rule 41’s two-step process should require government investigators, or a 
reviewing magistrate judge, to include limitations on the search and 
seizure of electronic information.  The limitations recommended by this 
Comment address concerns about whether government investigators 
using Rule 41’s two-step process have shown sufficient probable cause 
and stated what information they seek to retrieve with particularity. 
Currently, Rule 41’s two-step process allows government 
investigators to request an expansive amount of data, but the Rule does 
not require safeguards and limitations that ensure electronic information 
is not collected in an overbroad manner that violates an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.
17
  Magistrate judges are well suited to address 
this issue because Rule 41 requires a magistrate’s approval of the 
government’s search warrant application.  These judges can impose 
limitations on government searches and seizures that strike a balance 
between the government’s interest in fighting crime and an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  While no two investigations are identical, 
there are reasonable concerns regarding the sufficiency of search 
warrants for online accounts.  These concerns may be addressed by the 
imposition of modest limitations on the government’s acquisition and use 
of electronic information prior to or after the execution of a search 
warrant.  In the absence of congressional guidance on warrant procedures 
for electronic information or privacy-protective amendments to Rule 41, 
magistrate judges are best positioned to address this gap in Fourth 
Amendment law by imposing limitations on warrant applications that 
utilize Rule 41’s two-step process for electronic information. 
This Comment proceeds in two parts.  Part II explains the extent of 
information held by service providers on individual users and details the 
difficulty of applying Fourth Amendment law to electronic information.  
Part II also explains current law governing search warrants for electronic 
information, finding that a warrant is increasingly the tool relied upon by 
government investigators.  Part II then describes Rule 41’s procedural 
steps to obtain a search warrant for electronic information and concludes 
by examining decisions in three cases involving overbroad warrant 
applications.  Part III explains the inadequacy of Rule 41’s two-step 
                                                          
Cir. 2009) (describing violations of search warrants related to the government’s investigation of a 
company allegedly providing steroids to Major League Baseball players), vacated, 621 F.3d 1162 
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding the 
government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining records outside the 
scope of a warrant for more than two and a half years), reh’g granted, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015).   
 17.  See infra Part II.C.   
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process for electronic information and highlights crucial 2009 
Amendment Advisory Committee Notes regarding searches and seizures 
of electronic information.  This Comment finds Rule 41’s two-step 
process does not sufficiently protect Americans’ electronic information.  
To address this problem, this Comment argues for transparency and the 
imposition of one or more affirmative limitations on the government’s 
search and seizure of electronic information as two ways that the process 
can be improved to ensure the Fourth Amendment adequately protects 
the information generated by our online activities. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Problem 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of a warrant that is 
not supported by probable cause or a particular description of the person 
or things to be seized.  It is unclear how this prohibition applies to online 
services that collect and indefinitely store records that detail a user’s 
every activity on that particular service.  This information can tell an 
incredibly detailed story about a person’s activities online and offline.
18
  
This section discusses the massive amounts of data that individuals 
create every day online and traces the history of Fourth Amendment law 
as it struggles to keep pace with our digital society. 
1. Digital Trails Reveal Personal Tales 
Austrian law student Max Schrems discovered how comprehensive 
his digital trail was when he forced Facebook to disclose the digital 
records that the company retained on Schrems’s activity on the popular 
social networking site.
19
  Although Schrems challenged Facebook under 
the European Union’s data-protection laws, his case convinced Facebook 
to give all users  the ability to download a copy of the company’s records 
of their individual activities, regardless of their country’s laws.
20
  
                                                          
 18.  See Robert Krulwich, How Much Do They Know About Me in the ‘Cloud’?, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 27, 2012, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2012/02/27/147497042/how-much-do-they-know-about-me-
in-the-cloud (providing a short video on the immense amounts of data collected by online services).   
 19.  Kashmir Hill, Max Schrems: The Austrian Thorn in Facebook’s Side, FORBES (Feb. 7, 
2012, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/the-austrian-thorn-in-
facebooks-side/.   
 20.  Id.; Downloading Your Info, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/131112897028467/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).   
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Facebook, like many other popular Internet services, retains data on 
nearly every interaction a user has with the site.
21
  The comprehensive 
range of data Facebook retains includes, but is not limited to: credit card 
data, friend requests,
22
 Internet Protocol addresses showing a user’s 
physical location when logging into the site, content of messages sent 
and received via the site’s messaging service, all searches queried on the 
site, membership in groups, events, religious and political views, and 
wall posts.
23
  The universe of information is often hundreds of pages 




While the extent of the collection, use, and retention of data is often 
unclear, Facebook’s practices do not significantly differ from other 
companies offering services online.  Amazon, Skype, Apple, Microsoft, 
and other popular services maintain digital dossiers on their users.
25
  
Additionally, many large Internet companies provide ancillary services, 
such as an online address book, a personal calendar, photo-sharing 
services, or a blogging platform.
26
  Millions of Americans log in to these 
services every day to engage in countless activities such as 
communicating with friends and family, shopping online, or operating a 
small business.  These services make our lives easier, but our online 
activities can be used to piece together an incredibly rich tale of our 
lives.   
                                                          
 21.  See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2015).  Facebook and similar sites are routinely vague about their data retention policies.  
Id.  Facebook states, “[w]e store data for as long as it is necessary to provide products and services 
to you and others, including those described above.  Information associated with your account will 
be kept until your account is deleted, unless we no longer need the data to provide products and 
services.”  Id.  
 22.  Friend requests includes sent requests, received and pending requests, deleted requests, and 
removed friends.  Accessing Your Facebook Data, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/405183566203254 (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).   
 23.  Id.   
 24.  Kashmir Hill, Facebook Keeps a History of Everyone Who Has Ever Poked You, Along 
with a Lot of Other Data, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2011, 4:36 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/27/facebook-keeps-a-history-of-everyone-who-
has-ever-poked-you-along-with-a-lot-of-other-data/.  
 25.  Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084, 1089 (2002); Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the 
Fourth Amendment from Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to 
Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 343–45 (2013); Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal 
Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 15 & n.117 (2013).   
 26.  See, e.g., Products, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/products/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2015); Products, YAHOO, https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/products.html (last visited Oct. 
13, 2015).   
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2. Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Modern Technology 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the rights of citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
27
 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy 
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government 
officials.”
28
  And, “the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.’”
29
  Whether government action is reasonable is 
“measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the 
circumstances.”
30
  Reasonableness requires a warrant before a search or 
seizure occurs unless the government’s conduct is within an exception to 
the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances.
31
  An 
investigator must present a search warrant application for approval by a 
magistrate judge.
32
  The detached and neutral magistrate’s scrutiny is 
“intended to eliminate altogether searches not based on probable 
cause.”
33
  The application must set forth the facts and circumstances 
giving rise to the government’s probable cause to believe that the suspect 
committed, or will commit, a criminal offense, or to believe that 
evidence of a criminal offense will be found on the premises to be 
searched.
34
  The application must also describe any items and areas to be 
searched and seized with particularity.
35
  “[T]he scope of a lawful search 
                                                          
 27.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 28.  Camara v. S.F. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).  
 29.  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991)); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(explaining that “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”).   
 30.  Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39. 
 31.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  
 32.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), (d) (detailing how to obtain a warrant from a magistrate judge).  
 33.  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).  “[A]ny intrusion in the way of 
search or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior determination 
of necessity.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 34.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)–(d) (listing reasons for issuing a search warrant and requiring 
probable cause); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237–39 (1983) (explaining the amount of 
evidence required for a magistrate judge to find probable cause to issue a warrant). 
 35.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except 
one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’”). 
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is ‘defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is 
probable cause to believe that it may be found.’”
36
  The probable cause 
and particularity requirements are designed to avoid issuance of a 
“general warrant” where the government conducts a “general, 
exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.”
37
  The particularity 
requirement also “assures the individual whose property is searched or 
seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, 
and the limits of his power to search.”
38
 
Application of the Fourth Amendment to the Internet is an unsettled 
area of law.
39
  Technological advances and accompanying law 
enforcement techniques present novel issues in Fourth Amendment law.  
For example, the practice of wiretapping, where investigators intercept 
telephone conversations, was not initially considered a search or seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.
40
  In a dissenting opinion that stands the 
test of time as remarkably accurate, Justice Brandeis warned of future 
forms of espionage “by which the government, without removing papers 
from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be 
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”
41
  
Nearly forty years after its decision in Olmstead, the Supreme Court held 
that a wiretap without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
42
  Later 
that same year, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court, in an 
                                                          
 36.  Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).  “Just 
as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a 
warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being 
transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase.”  Id. at 84–85 (quoting Ross, 
456 U.S. at 824).  
 37.  Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (gathering cases).  See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 624–30 (1886) (discussing history of constitutional search and seizure law); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was “directed against general 
warrants”), overruled on other grounds by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); 
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84 (discussing particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment). 
 38.  Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 9 (1977)); contra United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006) (Justice Scalia rejects the 
notion of particularity serving as an assurance to the property owner, arguing that “neither the Fourth 
Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 imposes such a requirement” (citations 
omitted)).   
 39.  Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1006 (2010) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment]; see also Riley v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2473, 2488–91 (2014) (holding that a cell-phone search presents novel issues for the Court 
due to the device’s immense storage capacity); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 954–55 
(2012) (finding that the warrantless use of a GPS attached to a suspect’s car violated the Fourth 
Amendment on the basis of a trespass violation (Scalia, J., majority opinion) or a violation of the 
suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy (Sotamayor, J., concurring)).  
 40.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465–66. 
 41.  Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 42.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63–64 (1967).   
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attempt to adapt to new technologies, introduced a new test to determine 
the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.
43
  In Katz, the Supreme 
Court found that conversations in a public phone booth, when the door 
was shut behind the occupant, were protected by the Fourth Amendment 




In recent years, the Court tackled Global Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking,
45
 thermal imaging devices,
46
 and whether a warrant is required 
to search a cell phone seized during a lawful arrest.
47
  When holding that 
the use of a GPS tracking device constituted a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court grounded its reasoning in both trespass law and 
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.
48
  These recent decisions 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is worried about the Fourth 
Amendment rights of Americans in an era where technologies are more 
pervasive and susceptible to government use in espionage than 
previously seen.
49
  As investigative techniques closely resemble the 
techniques Justice Brandeis warned of in Olmstead, the Fourth 
Amendment must keep pace with technological changes and protect 
Americans from unreasonable invasions into their online lives. 
The difficulty of ensuring that the Fourth Amendment keeps pace 
with technological changes is evident when determining if probable 
cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment are met in 
a search warrant application for electronic information.  Probable cause 
and particularity share an interconnected role at the outset of a search.
50
  
Probable cause ensures items identified for search and seizure are 
connected with criminal activity, and it specifically identifies the places 
or persons to be searched, thereby ensuring probable cause is tailored to 




                                                          
 43.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  
 44.  Id. at 353, 358–59. 
 45.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 46.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).  
 47.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014).   
 48.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–53.   
 49.  See id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (highlighting concerns that “unrestrained power 
to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse” and noting that 
the  acquisition of “intimate information about any person . . . may ‘alter the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”). 
 50.  Nicole Friess, When Rummaging Goes Digital: Fourth Amendment Particularity and 
Stored Email Surveillance, 90 NEB. L. REV. 971, 985 (2012).   
 51.  Id. at 985–86. 
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Traditionally, establishing probable cause requires showing a “fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”
52
  In the digital context, probable cause is established 
when the electronic information “contain[s] contraband, evidence of a 
crime, fruits of a crime, or the instrumentality of a crime.”
53
  In the 
context of the search and seizure of an electronic account there are 
serious problems with Rule 41’s two-step process involving probable 
cause.  Probable cause will rarely be established to search and seize an 
entire electronic account unless the government is in some way able to 
demonstrate that the entire account is used solely for the purpose of 
committing the alleged crime.
54
 
The particularity requirement also presents unique challenges when 
applied to a search warrant for electronic information.  The Fourth 
Amendment’s particularity requirement is of increased importance in the 
digital era when intermingled documents and files are stored in a single 
place.
55
  Due to the potential for intermingled documents and other 
electronic information, “warrants for computer searches must 
affirmatively limit the search to evidence of specific federal crimes or 
specific types of material.”
56
  Thus, a search warrant application for 
electronic information must meet Fourth Amendment particularity 
requirements describing “the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”
57
  However, a brief review of documents to 
determine relevancy to an ongoing investigation is necessary.
58
  As 
Fourth Amendment law and the search warrant application process is 
applied to new technologies, a proper balance must be found between the 
                                                          
 52.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).   
 53.  Friess, supra note 50, at 982 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)). 
 54.  See, e.g., In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype 
Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO; 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW; 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-
8167-DJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123129, at *27 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (“The target accounts 
may contain large numbers of emails and files unrelated to the alleged crimes being investigated or 
for which the government has no probable cause to search and seize.”); In re Search of Info. 
Associated with @mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 152 (D.D.C. 2014) (“Here, the warrant describes 
only certain emails that are to be seized—and the government has only established probable cause 
for those emails.  Yet it seeks to seize all e-mails by having them ‘disclosed’ by Apple.”), vacated, 
13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014).  
 55.  See, e.g., United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the 
difficulties presented by the “modern development of the personal computer and its ability to store 
and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers”). 
 56.  Id. (quoting United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005)).   
 57.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 58.  See In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@Gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing precedent recognizing need 
to review information seized in a valid search to determine relevancy to investigation). 
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interconnected concepts of probable cause and particularity. 
B. Current Law 
Investigators are not always required to obtain a search warrant for 
some types of electronic information.  However, compelled disclosure of 
the contents of communications—allowing investigators to read user 
conversations—often requires a warrant.  This section describes the law 
currently governing the compelled disclosure of electronic information—
the Stored Communications Act.  The law’s structure and outdated 
nature often result in the decision to obtain electronic information by 
applying for a search warrant, rather than a subpoena, which is available 
with a lesser showing from the government.  This section concludes by 
showing that search warrant applications for electronic information are a 
tool increasingly relied upon for two reasons.  First, there are concerns 
about the constitutionality of obtaining the contents of communications 
without obtaining a warrant.  Second, companies that provide Internet 
services require a warrant before an individual’s records are disclosed. 
1. Stored Communications Act 
Government access to Americans’ electronic information is governed 
by the Stored Communications Act (SCA).
59
  Congress enacted the law 
in 1986 when it “had little idea of how the Fourth Amendment might 
apply to the Internet.”
60
  Although the SCA provided a workable 
approach to accessing electronic content in 1986, the way email systems 
operate and how Internet users handle email changed significantly 
following the SCA’s passage.
61
  Consequently, the SCA presents a 
confusing rubric that does not stand the test of time because it is difficult 
to apply to modern technologies. 
The focus of this paper is SCA section 2703, which provides a “code 
                                                          
 59.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012).  The statute has many nicknames, but is commonly called 
the SCA.  See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 n.1 (2004) [hereinafter User’s Guide]; 
see also NATHAN JUDISH ET AL., OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS 
AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 115 n.1 (2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
 60.  Fourth Amendment, supra note 39, at 1043; see also Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, 
Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored Email, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 123 (“[D]espite the 
explosion in use of electronic communications technologies since the SCA’s passage, Congress has 
not updated its terms or significantly changed its structure.”). 
 61.  Melissa Medina, Note, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern Times, 
63 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 271–73 (2013).  
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of criminal procedure that federal and state law enforcement officers 
must follow to compel disclosure of stored communications from 
network service providers.”
62
  In other words, SCA section 2703 governs 
situations where investigators desire content and electronic information 
held by a company such as Facebook or Google.  A wide range of 
information can be obtained by investigators without requesting a 
warrant; however, obtaining a search warrant is the most efficient way 
for government investigators to obtain the type and amount of 
information they desire.
63
  Although the government can compel 
disclosure of some types of information with only a subpoena, the 
government is able to obtain every type of information sought—
including the contents of private emails, messages, and other 
communications—if the request is accompanied by a search warrant.
64
  
Professor Orin Kerr explains the value of the “‘greater includes the 
lesser’ rule” by explaining that “[SCA] 2703 allows the government to 
obtain only one court order—whatever process is greatest—and compel 
all of the information in one order all at once.”
65
  This approach, where 
the government requests a warrant for all information maintained by a 




a. Understanding the SCA Decision Making Process 
An investigating officer has two important decisions to make when 
attempting to compel disclosure of a suspect’s electronic information 
from an Internet service.  First, the officer must determine the type of 
service provider in order to determine how to access the 
communications.  Second, the officer must determine the type of 
information sought in order to determine what tools the officer must use 
to compel the information.  These two decisions are important because 
the ease with which the government may access electronic information is 
dependent on the officer’s decisions.  This section briefly explains these 
two decisions and how the answer affects the government’s ability to 
access electronic information. 
                                                          
 62.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 115 (describing “three main substantive components” and noting 
section 2703’s purpose).   
 63.  See User’s Guide, supra note 59, at 1219–20. 
 64.  Id. at 1223 (displaying a chart that “summarizes the basic rules of the SCA”). 
 65.  Id. at 1220. 
 66.  See infra Part II.C.2.  
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i. The Type of Service Provider Determines Access to Contents of 
Communications 
According to the SCA, an agent must first determine what type of 
service provider holds the information.
67
  The statute provides two 
options.
68
  One option is an electronic communication service, defined as 
“any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive 
wire or electronic communications.”
69
  The second option is a remote 
computing service, defined as “the provision to the public of computer 
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications 
system.”
70
  The distinction between an electronic communication service 
(ECS) and a remote computing service (RCS) is of the utmost 
importance because the ease of access to the contents of emails and other 
messages hinges on that classification.  Investigators can obtain 
communications stored with an RCS if they obtain a search warrant 
under Rule 41 or utilize the subpoena procedure set forth in SCA section 
2703(b)(1)(B).
71
  Communications in electronic storage, held by an ECS 
provider for less than 180 days, may only be accessed with a warrant 
obtained pursuant to Rule 41.
72
  If an email or other communication is 
held in electronic storage by an ECS provider for 181 days or more, the 
communication is treated like content stored with an RCS.
73
 
Applied to modern technology and services, it is not readily apparent 
how a particular service is construed.
74
  In fact, many modern services 
can be construed as both an ECS and an RCS.
75
  Facebook is capable of 
                                                          
 67.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 117. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012); see also Medina, supra note 61, at 271–74 (explaining that 
an electronic communications service is analogous to early email systems in which messages were 
stored by the service until the user retrieved and removed the message from the service via a dial-up 
connection).   
 70.  18 U.S.C. § 2711(2).  An electronic communications system is “any wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic 
communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic 
storage of such communications.”  Id. § 2510(14); see also Medina, supra note 61, at 271–74 (noting 
modern examples of remote-computing services are Dropbox and any modern web-based email 
provider). 
 71.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).  Section 2703(b)(1)(B) allows the government to obtain information if 
it utilizes the SCA special-warrant procedure or an administrative subpoena so long as prior notice is 
given to a subscriber.  But, if the government requests it, notice may be delayed in additional ninety-
day increments.  Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii); id. § 2705(a)(1). 
 72.  Id. § 2703(a).   
 73.  Id.  
 74.  See JUDISH, supra note 59, at 117–20 (discussing different ways to determine whether a 
service is ECS or RCS). 
 75.  Id. at 120; see also User’s Guide, supra note 59, at 1215 (noting that many network service 
 
504 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
being both an ECS and RCS, as is almost every other service commonly 
used today.
76
  Thus, the government has flexibility to define many 
services in a manner that is favorable to its effort to compel disclosure of 
emails regardless of the number of days since the original transmission 
of the communication. 
ii. The Type of Information Sought Determines the Tool Needed to 
Compel Disclosure 
Next, after determining what type of service provider possesses the 
desired information, an agent must determine the proper classification for 
the information sought.
77
  There are three classifications:
78
 “basic 
subscriber and session information,”
79
 information that is “a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such 
service (not including the contents of the communications),”
80
 and “any 
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”
81
  Depending on the classification, the SCA provides 




One potential classification is “basic subscriber and session 
information,” a statutorily defined set of non-content records such as the 
name, physical address, IP address, payment method, and other items 
related to the user’s identity.
83
  Here, the government cannot obtain a 
copy of an email or message, but it can compel a provider to disclose a 
user’s location and other identifying information associated with the 
                                                          
providers are “multifunctional”).   
 76.  Allen D. Hankins, Note, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored 
Communications Act, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 295, 310 (2012) (discussing Crispin v. 
Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010), in which a court found Facebook to 
be both an ECS and RCS); see Eric P. Mandel, A Hurdle to Obtaining Electronic Evidence, LAW360 
(July 11, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/455225/a-hurdle-to-obtaining-
electronic-evidence (“In the practical sense, email, text messages and instant messages go through 
ECS providers, while RCS providers offer storage and processing services.  While there might have 
been a greater distinction in 1986, all ECS providers are now essentially RCS providers as well.  Yet 
there are some pure RCS providers, such as Dropbox and Amazon Web Services.”). 
 77.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 121. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). 
 81.  Id. § 2510(8).   
 82.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 127–34 (discussing the forms of compelled disclosure used with 
each classification of data). 
 83.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); see also JUDISH, supra note 59, at 121. 
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user’s activity on the site.
84
  A provider of either an ECS or RCS is 
required to disclose this basic, non-content type of information to a 
government entity after receiving a properly obtained subpoena.
85
 
Information can also be classified as “a record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such service (not including 
the contents of the communications).”
86
  As the statute explicitly 
provides, contents of communications are not accessible here.  However, 
this category serves as a catchall, including a wide variety of non-content 
information such as transactional records, cell-site data for cellular phone 
calls, lists of Internet sites accessed, and email addresses the account 
holder corresponds with.
87
  As with basic subscriber and session 
information, this classification does not include the contents of a 
communication.
88
  Importantly, Congress intended  basic subscriber and 
session information to be distinguishable from the section 2703(c)(1) 
information that could reveal a “person’s entire on-line profile.”
89
  This 
classification allows a more comprehensive compilation of a user’s 
activity by including information that more fully details an individual’s 
online activity.  The information in this classification is available to an 
investigator if a warrant is obtained pursuant to Rule 41.
90
  Or the 
government may obtain a special warrant
91
 under SCA section 2703(d) to 
compel disclosure of this information.
92
 
The third classification of information is content-based.
93
  In relation 
to “any wire, oral, or electronic communication,” contents include “any 
information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”
94
  Investigators with a search warrant may obtain 
“everything that can be obtained using a § 2703(d) court order with 
                                                          
 84.  Id. § 2703(c)(1)–(2). 
 85.  Id. § 2703(c)(2).  The government can also secure this information by other means. See id. 
§ 2703(c)(1). 
 86.  Id. § 2703(c)(1). 
 87.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 122. 
 88.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). 
 89.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 122 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 17, 31–32 (1994), 
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3497, 3511–12).   
 90.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A). 
 91.  The SCA provides a special warrant procedure in which the government is not required to 
establish probable cause but rather may compel disclosure of non-content information by showing 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  Id. § 2703(d).   
 92.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B).  Section 2703 also provides two other ways to obtain this 
information, but these procedures are not applicable to the procedures discussed in this paper.  
 93.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 121. 
 94.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).   
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notice”
95
 and “the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is 
in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one 
hundred and eighty days or less.”
96
  This classification includes the 
contents of every communication a user has stored on a service.
97
 
While the SCA created divisions based on the type of provider and 
type of information involved in an investigation, a search warrant is the 
tool that allows the government to compel disclosure of everything 
associated with a user account.  As Professor Orin Kerr suggests, the 
efficiency of using a single tool—a search warrant application—is 
evident given the SCA’s structure.
98
  Though a search warrant requires 
judicial approval, government investigators can obtain every 
classification of information with a single search warrant application. 
99
 
2. Warshak Precedent and Online Services Require Search Warrants 
Although the SCA does not always require a search warrant before 
the government may compel disclosure of our most sensitive records, 
two additional factors may force a government investigator to obtain a 
search warrant before accessing electronic information.  First, concerns 
about the constitutionality of electronic searches may cause an 
investigator to request a search warrant.
100
  Second, the company 
providing the Internet service may demand a warrant before it will 
disclose information on its users.
101
  As this section explains, these 
factors suggest that investigations utilizing search warrants for electronic 
information will likely increase in frequency.  The judiciary is well 
positioned to determine the sufficiency and boundaries of search 
warrants for electronic information when faced with this increasingly 
common issue. 
a. United States v. Warshak Raises Concerns About the SCA’s 
Constitutionality 
 An investigator might obtain a warrant if there is concern that a 
                                                          
 95.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 133. 
 96.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)). 
 97.  Id. at 122–23. 
 98.  User’s Guide, supra note 59, at 1220. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  See infra Section II.B.2.a.  
 101.  NATE CARDOZO ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING 
YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT REQUESTS 8 (2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/15/who-
has-your-back-2014-govt-data-requests.pdf. 
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court may later invalidate a search and seizure made via subpoena as 
unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
reasonableness of privacy expectations in electronic communications.
102
  
But provisions of the SCA that require disclosure of content-information 
without a warrant were found unconstitutional in 2010 in a landmark 
Sixth Circuit decision, United States v. Warshak.
103
  Embracing 
petitioner Warshak’s argument that “the government’s warrantless, ex 
parte seizure of approximately 27,000 of his private emails”
104
 was an 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
the Sixth Circuit invalidated SCA section 2703(b)(1)(B).
105
  Although no 
other federal circuit court has adopted Warshak’s rule, various courts 
have extended Warshak’s reasoning to other online and electronic 
content information.
106
  If additional jurisdictions adopt the Warshak 
holding, or extend it to online content information held by social media 
companies, investigators will be required to obtain a warrant before 
compelling disclosure of content information. 
b. Online Services Require Search Warrants Before Disclosing User 
Information 
The second reason an investigator might obtain a warrant is because 
of company policies that mandate a warrant before disclosing content 
information.  Following the Warshak decision, a growing number of 
service providers are demanding investigators obtain a warrant before 
disclosing content information.
107
  The Electronic Frontier Foundation’s 
                                                          
 102.  In fact, the Court has rarely decided issues of constitutionality relating to modern 
surveillance laws in general.  See Friess, supra note 50, at 984 (citing Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), as two notable exceptions); see also Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (holding that police must obtain a warrant to search a cell 
phone incident to a lawful arrest).   
 103.  631 F.3d 266, 282–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
emails stored with third-party email provider); see also The Courts Boldly Go Fourth: Rulings 
Validate Digital Due Process, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.: BLOG (Dec. 16, 2010) (discussing 
Warshak and a related case), https://cdt.org/blog/the-courts-boldly-go-fourth-rulings-validate-digital-
due-process/. 
 104.  Warshak, 631 F.3d at 282.   
 105.  Id. at 288 (“[T]o the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain . . . 
emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.”). 
 106.  E.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 
1142–43 (D. Minn. 2012) (holding user has reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook private 
messages and search of account by school official was unreasonable); State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 
605, 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (“The rationale used by the Warshak court in establishing individuals’ 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their email is equally applicable to cell phone 
users’ expectation of privacy in the contents of their text messages.”).  
 107.  CARDOZO, supra note 101, at 13–14.  
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(EFF) annual “Who has your back?” report identifies Amazon, Apple, 
Verizon, and Yahoo as publicly committing, within the last year, to 
requiring a warrant before content information is disclosed.
108
  The civil 
liberties group noted that its 2014 report is “encouraging” because many 
companies implemented additional protections for user data when 
compared to the group’s initial report in 2011.
109
  According to the EFF 
report, the list of Internet companies requiring a warrant before 
disclosing content information includes, but is not limited to: Amazon, 




C. Current Procedure 
There are four important differences between warrants for online and 
offline searches and seizures: (1) the two-step process for electronic 
information; (2) jurisdiction to issue a search warrant; (3) notice 
requirements; and (4) the requirements relating to the presence of an 
officer during execution of the search warrant.  Following a description 
of these differences, this section examines three cases that highlight the 
complexities of a search warrant for electronic information. 
1. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41’s Two-Step Process 
An investigator is required to obtain a warrant for electronic content 
information under the procedures detailed in Rule 41.
111
  Like a warrant 
for a physical search or seizure, a warrant for electronic content 
information must meet certain fundamental criteria.  A search warrant 
application must be based on probable cause, particularly describe the 
persons or items to be searched and seized, and be supported by an 
affidavit, whether it is for electronic content or offline search or 
seizure.
112
  Though subject to these requirements, a warrant for electronic 
information has multiple features distinguishing it from a standard 
warrant executed in the offline world.
113
  The 2009 amendments to Rule 
41 specifically addressing the two-step process declined to address “the 
specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a 
                                                          
 108.  Id. at 21, 23, 59, 67. 
 109.  Id. at 12.  
 110.  Id. at 18.   
 111.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (b).  
 112.  Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.  
 113.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 133–34. 
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warrant for electronically stored information.”
114
  The Advisory 
Committee chose to “leav[e] the application of this and other 
constitutional standards concerning both the seizure and the search to 
ongoing case law development.”
115
  However, this is problematic 
because this lack of guidance leads to confusion about whether the 
government is sufficiently meeting Fourth Amendment standards in 
recent investigations. 
The most important difference between a warrant in the physical 
world and a warrant for electronic information is Rule 41’s two-step 
process for electronic information.  This is important because it allows an 
officer to “seize or copy the entire storage medium and review it later to 
determine what electronically stored information falls within the scope of 
the warrant.”
116
  The process allows the government to first compel 
disclosure of a large universe of information and then conduct a search 
for items related to its investigation.  In the initial step, the “warrant 
directs the service provider to produce all email from within the specified 
account or accounts.”
117
  In the subsequent step, the warrant allows “law 
enforcement to review the information produced to identify and copy 
information that falls within the scope of the particularized ‘items to be 
seized’ under the warrant.”
118
  As a practical matter, Rule 41 limits the 
timeframe for when the warrant must be executed to fourteen days.
119
  
However, no presumptive limitations are placed on the amount of time 
investigators may retain the data for review purposes.
120
 
A second distinction involves jurisdiction.  Generally, a magistrate 
judge has authority to issue a warrant only for items and persons within 
the district.
121
  A magistrate judge, however, may issue a warrant “for a 
person or property outside the district if the person or property is located 
within the district when the warrant is issued but might move or be 
moved outside the district before the warrant is executed.”
122
  These 
                                                          
 114.  FED R. CRIM. P. 41 committee’s notes to 2009 amendment, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/pdf/USCODE-2011-title18-app-federalru-
dup1-rule41.pdf.   
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id.   
 117.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 134. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A).   
 120.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 committee’s notes to 2009 amendments. 
 121.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). 
 122.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2).  Additionally, the Rule provides a magistrate judge with 
authority to issue a warrant for information outside the district if the investigation relates to 
terrorism, a tracking device, or outside jurisdictions in which the United States has a strong interest.  
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3)–(5). 
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limitations are not sustainable in an online world where companies store 
user content and data on servers located throughout the world.  
Consequently, courts allow magistrate judges to issue a warrant for 
electronic information held in another jurisdiction.
123
 
A third distinguishing feature of search warrants for electronic 
content involves the requirement of notice.  Generally, after executing a 
warrant for a search or seizure in the physical world, an executing officer 
must leave a copy of the warrant with the person from whom property 
was seized or on the premises from which property was removed.
124
  The 
SCA expressly negates this requirement for the online world by 
providing that a warrant may be served on an RCS “without required 
notice to the subscriber or customer.”
125
  Separate provisions pertaining 
to an administrative subpoena or a section 2703(d) court order do not 
expressly negate the notice requirement of Rule 41.
126
  However, given 
the notice requirements and ability to subsequently delay notice 
regardless of the procedure,
127
 agents can obtain electronic content 
information without notice to the subject of the investigation if a warrant 
is obtained. 
A final distinguishing feature concerns the presence of an officer 
during the execution of the warrant.  While an officer or government 
representative is necessarily required to be present when a search is 
executed in the physical world, the SCA does not require the presence of 
an officer for service or execution of the warrant.
128
  In executing a 
warrant for electronic information, the provider is often served in a 




2. Rule 41’s Two-Step Process in Action 
 Magistrate judges are “revolting” against search warrant 
applications that grant the government access to the entirety of an 
                                                          
 123.  E.g., United States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 392, 396–98 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Yahoo, Inc., No. 
07-3194-MB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37601, at *22 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007); In re Search Warrant, 
No. 6:05-MC-168-Orl-31JGG, 2005 WL 3844032, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2006). 
 124.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
 125.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A). 
 126.  Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).  
 127.  Id. § 2705. 
 128.  Id. § 2703(g).   
 129.  JUDISH, supra note 59, at 134; see also United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1068 (8th 
Cir. 2002) (finding that the search of email by an ISP without presence of law enforcement did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment).  
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account.
130
  In the five years following the Advisory Committee’s refusal 
to provide guidance on search warrants of this type, case law developed 
in a hopelessly confusing manner and no consensus emerged on how the 
Fourth Amendment should best protect users’ online activity and 
electronic information.  Faced with the difficult task of applying the 
Fourth Amendment to the digital era, magistrate judges are denying 
search warrant applications that seek access to vast numbers of email and 
vast amounts of electronic information.
131
  While multiple opinions now 
set forth an individual magistrate judge’s reasoning behind the denial or 
approval of a search warrant application, the legal reasoning varies 
across the country.  Magistrate judges in Kansas and Washington, D.C. 
denied these overly broad warrant applications, whereas a magistrate 
judge for the Southern District of New York approved a similar warrant 
application.
132
  These cases demonstrate the lack of settled standards for 
a search and seizure of electronic information in an online service 
provider’s possession. 
a. Examining In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target 
Email Accounts/Skype Accounts 
Magistrate Judge David Waxse of the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas has denied multiple search warrant applications 
for electronic content and data.  When initially approaching the issue in 
2012, Judge Waxse denied a search warrant application for electronic 
content that sought the entirety of a Yahoo account.
133
  Judge Waxse also 
                                                          
 130. E.g., Ann E. Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law 
Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/low-level-federal-judges-balking-at-law-enforcement-
requests-for-electronic-evidence/2014/04/24/eec81748-c01b-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html; 
Patrick J. Cotter, Magistrates’ Revolt: Unexpected Resistance to Federal Government Efforts to Get 
“General Warrants” for Electronic Information, NAT’L L. REV. (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/magistrates-revolt-unexpected-resistance-to-federal-
government-efforts-to-get-genera. 
 131.  E.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with @mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 
2014), renewed application denied, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 
(D.D.C. 2014); In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype 
Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-
8167-DJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123129, *24–28 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013); In re Cunnius, 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1139 (W.D. Wash. 2011).  
 132.  In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 394–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 133.  In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-
DJW, 12-MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138465, at *2–4, *27–30 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) 
(finding that the government lacked probable cause to seize and search such a large amount of data 
and finding the lack of limitations on the investigative process troubling).   
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In In re Search Warrants for Information Associated with Target 
Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, Judge Waxse once again denied a 
search warrant application for the entirety of accounts held by several 
Internet companies.
135
  The government alleged that the suspect utilized 
several online services to “facilitate the purchase, receipt, and 
transportation” of stolen property.
136
  As part of its investigation, the 
government sought to compel five providers—Google, GoDaddy, 
Verizon, Yahoo, and Skype—to disclose the contents of communications 
related to its investigation.
137
 
The government utilized Rule 41’s two-step process to compel 
disclosure of the electronic content.
138
  In the first step, the government 
identified the information to be disclosed by the five providers under the 
SCA compelled-disclosure provisions.
139
  The government’s request in 
this first step included an astonishingly large amount of information 
because the government sought a comprehensive disclosure of every 
piece of information associated with the five separate accounts.
140
  It is 
                                                          
 134.  In re Search of Three Cellphones, No. 14-MJ-8013-DJW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108470, 
at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2014); In re Search of a Nextel Cellular Tel., 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88215, at *1 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014). 
 135.  2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123129, at *1–2. 
 136.  Id. at *2. 
 137.  Id. at *1. 
 138.  Id. at *2–4.  
 139.  Id. 
 140.  The government sought:  
The contents of all emails, instant messages, and chat logs/sessions associated with the 
account, including stored or preserved copies of emails, instant messages, and chat 
logs/sessions sent to and from the account; draft emails; deleted emails, instant messages, 
and chat logs/sessions preserved pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f); 
the source and destination addresses associated with each email, instant message, and 
chat logs/session, as well as the date and time at which each email, instant message, and 
chat logs/session was sent, and the size and length of each email; 
All records or other information regarding the identification of the account, to include full 
name, physical address, telephone numbers and other identifiers, records of session times 
and durations, the date on which the account was created, the length of service, the types 
of service utilized, the IP address used to register the account, log-in IP addresses 
associated with session times and dates, account status, alternative email addresses 
provided during registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of 
payment (including any credit or bank account number); 
All records or other information stored by an individual using the account, including 
address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar data, pictures, and files; and 
All records pertaining to communications between (Provider) and any person regarding 
the account, including contacts with support services and records of actions taken. 
Id. at *3–4. 
2015] LET THE MAGISTRATES REVOLT 513 
difficult, if not impossible, to find information potentially held by one of 
the five providers that is outside the scope of the government’s request.  
In this initial step, the government did not list a date range or other basic 
limitations on the disclosure.
141
 
The second step of the government’s request stated that the 
government would “maintain all information that constitutes fruits, 
evidence, and instrumentalities” of the alleged violations.
142
  The 
government identified the types of information in a broad and imprecise 
manner, but the information was limited to the alleged crimes.
143
  In 
contrast to the first step of the warrant application, the government 
limited the information it would maintain to only that occurring “from 




After scrutinizing the SCA in relation to the Fourth Amendment, 
Judge Waxse denied the government’s search warrant application for two 
reasons.
145
  First, Judge Waxse found that the compelled disclosure was 
“too broad and too general.”
146
  Although not explicitly stated as such, 
Judge Waxse’s objection was that the government did not establish 
probable cause for the breadth of emails and account information sought 
as part of its investigation.  The warrants would have authorized 
disclosure of “all email communications in their entirety and all 
information about the account without restriction.”
147
  The sections of the 
warrant describing content to be disclosed by the providers was deemed 
the “most troubling” part because the “warrants fail to limit the universe 
                                                          
 141.  Id.  The government’s request also indicates it had previously requested content 
preservation as provided for by section 2703(f) of the SCA.  Id. at *3.  Given this aspect of the 
request, and lack of any date range to guide companies, there is no reason to believe that the 
government cannot obtain the entirety of the providers’ records on an individual suspect.  
 142.  Id. at *4. 
 143.  The government sought to maintain:  
All stored electronic mail, instant message, and chat logs/session[s] sent to, from, and 
through (target account) and all related subscriber accounts from June 2006, when the 
conspiracy commenced until the date of the search warrant to include communications 
involving the transportation or receipt of stolen property; 
Records relating to who created, used, or communicated with the (target account) or 
identifiers, including records about their identities and whereabouts; and 
All records related to the subscriber account of (all target accounts), including account 
information, computer host names, Internet addresses, passwords, access telephone 
numbers, password files, and other identifying information. 
Id. at *4–5.  
 144.  Id. at *4.  
 145.  Id. at *24–25. 
 146.  Id. at *25. 
 147.  Id.  
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of electronic communications and information to be turned over to the 
government to the specific crimes being investigated.”
148
  Judge Waxse 
identified the critical problem concerning probable cause, noting that 
“[t]he target accounts may contain large numbers of emails and files 
unrelated to the alleged crimes being investigated or for which the 
government has no probable cause to search and seize.”
149
  Judge Waxse 
noted that probable cause was not established to search and seize “all 
emails ever sent to or from the accounts or for all the information 
requested from the Providers.”
150
 
Judge Waxse’s second objection focused on the absence of 
limitations set forth by the government regarding the review of the 
“potentially large” amount of electronic information to be disclosed.
151
  
The warrant applications did not include a procedure for sorting or 
filtering relevant information from information outside the scope of the 
government’s investigation of the alleged conspiracy.
152
  Judge Waxse 
analogized such an electronic request without limitations to a warrant 
seeking to search copies of all physical mail ever sent through a post 
office to or from a specific address, a request that violates the Fourth 
Amendment because such procedures are unreasonable.
153
  Judge Waxse 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not require a particular 
search strategy or methodology, but he did find that “the warrants must 
contain some limits” to comply with the Fourth Amendment.
154
 
b. Examining In re Search of Information Associated with @mac.com 
Magistrate Judge John Facciola is a prominent member of the 
Magistrates’ Revolt.
155
  Similar to Judge Waxse, Judge Facciola denied 
search warrant applications for electronic information on the basis that 
the applications were too broad and general to meet Fourth Amendment 
standards.
156
  Judge Facciola also denied overbroad search warrant 
                                                          
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. at *27. 
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at *25. 
 152.  Id. at *25–26. 
 153.  Id. at *28. 
 154.  Id. at *30.  
 155.  See sources cited supra note 130.  
 156.  In re Search of Info. Associated with @mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2014), 
renewed application denied, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 
2014); see also In re Search of Info. Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the 
Username Aaron.Alexis, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9–11 (D.D.C. 2013) (modifying warrant application to 
prevent wholesale disclosure of electronic content outside the scope of probable cause).   
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applications for cellular phone and handheld tablet investigations.
157
 
One recent denial of a search warrant application by Judge Facciola 
is In re Search of Information Associated with @mac.com.
158
  There, 
following the denial of its first application, the government renewed its 
motion for a search warrant application.
159
  The government’s renewed 
search warrant application contained three attachments.
160
  The first 
attachment specified the @mac.com account at issue in the 
investigation.
161
  This attachment also specified that the government 
sought information from January 2014 forward.
162
  The next attachment 
detailed the “[p]articular things to be seized by the government.”
163
  
Here, the government limited its seizure to information “referring or 
relating” to a government investigation involving a myriad list of 
companies the government suspected may have been involved in the 
crime.
164
  The third attachment detailed “[p]rocedures to facilitate 
execution of the warrant.”
165
  This section was similar to Rule 41’s first 
step where the government identifies information to be disclosed by a 
provider.  As with search warrant applications before Judge Waxse, the 
government’s requested disclosure was massive in scope, and it is 
difficult to think of information that was outside the scope of the 
government’s request.
166
  Although the universe of information disclosed 
                                                          
 157.  In re Search of Apple iPhone, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 161 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Search of Odys 
Loox Plus Tablet, 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2014).  
 158.  13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 157 (D.D.C.), vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 159.  Id. at 147.  
 160.  Id. at 148. 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  The government sought: 
All emails, including email content, attachments, source and destination addresses, and 
time and date information, that constitute evidence and instrumentalities of violations of 
41 U.S.C. § 8702 (Solicitation and Receipt of Kickbacks) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(Conspiracy), dated between [January], 2014, to the present, including emails referring or 
relating to a government investigation involving any or all of the following: [Redacted 
list of names of companies and individuals in the form of “John Smith, John Smith, Inc., 
any current or former John Smith employees, etc.”]. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  The government’s broad request was phrased as follows:  
To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is within the possession, 
custody, or control of the Provider, including any emails that have been deleted but are 
still available to the Provider, or have been preserved pursuant to a request made under 
18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) [in January], 2014, the Provider is required to disclose the following 
information to the government for the account listed in Attachment A: all emails, 
including attachments, associated with the account, dating from [January], 2014, to the 
present, and including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the account, 
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by a provider is similar to requests in previously described rulings, the 
government recommended procedures for the search and seizure after 
receiving the information from Apple that were not recommended in the 
warrants examined by Judge Waxse.
167
  These procedures allowed the 
government to search the large universe of information disclosed by 
Apple and stated that the government will seal, but not return or delete, 
any information it found that was not within the scope of the warrant.
168
 
Although this search warrant application varied in important ways 
from the search warrant application denied by Judge Waxse, Judge 
Facciola reached the same decision as Judge Waxse and found the 
application was too broad and too general.
169
  Judge Facciola explained 
that he denied the previous application because the government sought to 
seize an entire email account without establishing probable cause for all 
of the emails, and the government failed to explain what would happen 
to data beyond the scope of the warrant following the initial seizure.
170
  




Judge Facciola disapproved of the government’s use of Rule 41’s 
two-step procedure.
172
  He reasoned that the two-step procedure was only 
proper after a showing of practical need by the government.
173
  After 
distinguishing a hard drive or cell phone from an email or other 
                                                          
draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with each email, the date 
and time at which each email was sent, and the size and length of each email. 
Apple shall deliver the information set forth above via United States mail, courier, or 
email to: [The Department of Justice]. 
Id. (alterations in original).  
 167.  The government’s suggested procedure was:  
The United States government will conduct a search of the emails produced by the 
Provider and determine which are within the scope of the information to be seized 
specified in Attachment B. Those that are within the scope of Attachment B may be 
copied and retained by the United States. 
Law enforcement personnel will then seal any information from Apple that does not fall 
within the scope of Attachment B and will not further review the information absent an 
order of the Court. 
Id. at 148–49. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See id. at 149 (“[T]he government requests that Apple provide all e-mails from a certain 
date in January, 2014, so that the government may search them for evidence of specific crimes and 
keep any non-relevant e-mails under seal until further order of a court.”).   
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 150 (“Although there are some cosmetic differences between the original application 
and the Renewed Application, the bottom line is that the government still gets all e-mails—
regardless of their relevance to its investigation—and keeps them indefinitely.”).  
 172.  Id. at 152–53. 
 173.  Id. at 153. 
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electronic content held by a provider, Judge Facciola suggested the 
extraordinary step of having Apple perform an initial search, pursuant to 
the warrant, then disclose only the emails that the government can 
establish probable cause for.
174
  Judge Facciola noted that his suggestion 
was going into unexplored territory because it was a step beyond what 
other courts had done.
175
  In response to his own question of whether his 
court could order Apple to disclose emails outside the warrant’s scope, 
Judge Facciola emphatically declared, “[t]he answer is no.”
176
 
Like Judge Waxse’s ruling, Judge Facciola rejected the search 
warrant application because its lack of limitations made it overbroad.
177
  
The government did not suggest an alternative approach in response to 
Judge Facciola’s recommendation to utilize Apple’s expertise in 
performing an initial disclosure narrowly tailored to the application’s 
probable-cause showing.
178
  Additionally, the government ignored 
previous warnings against retaining information outside the search 
warrant’s scope and attempted to do so once again.
179
  According to 
Judge Facciola, the government’s request to indefinitely retain the 
entirety of a user’s email account, even under seal, was 
“inconceivable . . . and unacceptable.”
180
  Although Judge Facciola did 
not specify a certain limitation procedure, it is clear that he believes that 
some limitations are needed when the government seeks, or receives, the 
entirety of a user’s email account or other electronic content.
181
 
The government responded to Judge Facciola’s second denial of its 
search warrant application by challenging the denial order in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
182
  The District Court 
ultimately vacated Judge Facciola’s order and granted the search 
warrant.
183
  The District Court cited several key reasons for doing so.  
First, the government’s search was “constrained and limited” to the 
specific items listed as “to be seized” in the application’s second 
                                                          
 174.  Id. at 153–54. 
 175.  Id. at 154. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  See id. at 155–56 (discussing government’s failure to establish probable cause and breadth 
of the request). 
 178.  See id. at 155 (“[T]he government is unwilling–for whatever reason–to give up its policy of 
seizing large quantities of emails and other Fourth Amendment protected data . . . .”). 
 179.  Id. at 155–56. 
 180.  Id. at 155. 
 181.  Id. at 155–56. 
 182.  In re Search of Info Associated with @mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014).  
 183.  Id. at 159–60. 
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attachment.
184
  Second, the court found the search warrant sufficiently 
particular, despite its breadth, because “there is a fair probability that the 
electronic communications and records that the government seeks . . . 
will be found in the particular place to be searched.”
185
  Finally, after 
examining the two-step procedure relied on by the government, the court 
determined that the government’s application complied with Rule 41.
186
 
Finally, the District Court found Judge Facciola’s suggestion—use 
Apple to conduct an initial search to limit the scope of the disclosure— 
to be inadequate.
187
  The District Court noted that having Apple perform 
an initial search was problematic for several reasons.  Apple employees 
are not trained to determine whether particular content is relevant to an 
investigation, the suggested procedure is costly, time-consuming, and 
could “expose the government to potential security breaches.”
188
 
c. Examining In re Warrant for All Content & Other Information 
Associated with the Email Account xxxxxxx@Gmail.com 
Judge Gorenstein, of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, reached a contrary decision on a similar 
request to those before Judges Waxse and Facciola.
189
  The search 
warrant application utilized Rule 41’s two-step process to seek the 
entirety of a Google account and did not limit the information to be 
disclosed to a specific date range.
190
  Judge Gorenstein did not interpret 
the Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause requirement narrowly and 
allowed the government to obtain electronic information falling outside 
the scope of the warrant.
191
  After comparing a search of a computer hard 
drive with that of an email inbox, Judge Gorenstein tackled the 
complexity of electronic searches.
192
   Ultimately, Gorenstein held that 
Rule 41(e)(2)(B) supported the Government’s argument that the two-step 
procedure was proper and approved the request.
193
  However, Judge 
Gorenstein did find Judge Facciola’s suggestion to have a third-party 
                                                          
 184.  Id. at 164. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 165. 
 187.  Id. at 165–66. 
 188.  Id.  
 189.  In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email Account 
xxxxxxx@Gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d 386, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 190.  Id. at 388–89.  
 191.  Id. at 391–92.  
 192.  Id. at 392–94.  
 193.  Id. at 393–94. 
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service provider conduct an initial review of a user’s content persuasive 
in cases where the service provider could “produce responsive material 
in a manner devoid of the exercise of skill or discretion.”
194
 
Judge Gorenstein did not require the government to affirmatively 
limit its ability to retain the information obtained or to include a search 
protocol in the warrant application.
195
  Although he noted several 
decisions where the government had proposed limitations in “secondary 
orders” that provided for the return or destruction of records not within 
the scope of the warrant, Judge Gorenstein did not hold the application 
before him to such standards.
196
  Judge Gorenstein noted the potential 
recourse a user may take if the government acts improperly in the 
execution of the search warrant.
197
  Finally, Judge Gorenstein noted that 
while it is permissible to mandate search protocols in the application, he 




After examining current law and reviewing the overbroad search 
warrant applications described in Part II, Part III offers two suggestions 
for magistrate judges to consider when deciding whether a search 
warrant application meets Fourth Amendment standards.  First, 
transparency is crucial to the development of Fourth Amendment law.  
Magistrate judges should contribute to ongoing case law by publishing 
opinions that explain the reasoning underlying a decision to approve or 
deny a search warrant application.  Second, Rule 41 must be updated to 
require affirmative limitations on a search warrant sought using Rule 
41’s two-step process for electronic information.  Part III suggests a 
number of modest limitations that a magistrate judge may impose when 
presented with an overbroad search warrant application.  Given the 
varying nature of criminal investigations, no one-size-fits-all limitation 
should be implemented.  However, modest limitations can be imposed in 
combination with other limitations, or as a stand-alone measure, to 
ensure a search warrant for electronic information does not violate a 
citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
                                                          
 194.  Id. at 394.   
 195.  See id. at 396–401 (explaining that courts need not define the proper procedure to execute a 
warrant, instead analysis focuses on the reasonableness of the search). 
 196.  Id. at 396, 400–01. 
 197.  Id. at 398. 
 198.  Id. at 400.   
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A. Transparency in Search Warrant Applications is Necessary 
Criminal investigations are necessarily secretive.  It is obvious why, 
when submitting a search warrant application, the government does not 
want its target to receive notice of the warrant or investigation.  
However, the sealed nature of search warrants hinders a judge’s ability to 
tackle the issue of specificity when presented with an application for 
electronic information.  The 2009 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 41 
explicitly declined to address the specificity of description for electronic 
information in a search warrant, “leaving the application of this and other 
constitutional standards concerning both the seizure and the search to 
ongoing case law development.”
199
  However, case law is not readily 
found in many jurisdictions and there are even fewer district or circuit 
court decisions addressing the sufficiency of a warrant for electronic 
information.  Magistrate judges should contribute to ongoing case law in 
the area of search warrants for electronic information by publishing and 
explaining their decisions—but only after publication would no longer 
threaten the government’s investigation. 
Faced with a search warrant application for electronic information, 
Judge Gorenstein approved the government’s request immediately after 
reviewing the application.
200
  However, Judge Gorenstein recognized 
opinions to the contrary in other jurisdictions and published a written 
opinion five weeks later that explained the approval of the government’s 
request.
201
  This is a positive step that helps all parties understand the 
nature of the government’s request and the judiciary’s legal reasoning.  
This practice is valuable to other law enforcement officials, members of 
the judiciary at all levels, and to attorneys representing those charged 
with crimes where a search warrant for electronic information was used 
in the government’s investigation. 
B. Affirmative Limitations Are Necessary to Curb Overbroad Search 
Warrant Applications 
In denying the warrant applications before him, Judge Waxse’s chief 
concern was the absence of limitations on the government’s review of 
                                                          
 199.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 committee’s note to 2009 amendments.  
 200.  See In re xxxxxxx@Gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (“On June 11, 2014, this Court was 
presented with an application for a search warrant . . . . The Court granted the application on the day 
it was presented.”). 
 201.  Id. at 388.  
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information obtained pursuant to the search warrant.
202
  Judge Facciola 
expressed similar concerns in denying the warrant applications before 
him.
203
  Given the importance of ensuring Fourth Amendment 
protections, Judge Waxse and Judge Facciola present persuasive 
reasoning.  Guidance provided by Rule 41 and its accompanying 
comments on electronic search and seizures must require search warrant 
applications for electronic information to affirmatively limit the 
Government’s use and retention of information disclosed pursuant to the 
Rule’s two-step process.  Magistrate judges should mandate a minimum 
level of affirmative limitations when approving a warrant for disclosures 
pursuant to Rule 41.  As the complexities of technology are numerous, 
setting such a limitation on the government’s conduct is inherently 
difficult and will be dependent on the specifics of each investigation. 
This section provides four affirmative limitations that may be 
imposed by magistrate judges to ensure the Fourth Amendment protects 
electronic information held by an online service provider.  Magistrate 
judges could require investigators to narrow the scope of the disclosure if 
there is evidence that the criminal activity only occurred during a certain 
time period.  Alternatively, magistrate judges could impose a limitation 
on the type of information the government obtains if there is no showing 
of need for that particular type of information.  A filtering agent or 
Special Master conducting the search of an account may be a sufficient 
limitation on investigators’ ability to search the entirety of an account.  
Finally, magistrate judges should not hesitate to impose limitations on 
the government’s retention of the information received after a search 
warrant is executed.  Although magistrate judges must balance an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right with the government’s need to 
fight crime, these affirmative limitations are reasonable steps that could 
provide a proper level of protection for electronic information. 
                                                          
 202.  See In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype 
Accounts, Nos. 13-MJ-8163-JPO, 13-MJ-8164-DJW, 13-MJ-8165-DJW, 13-MJ-8166-JPO, 13-MJ-
8167-DJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123129, at *25 (D. Kan. Aug. 27, 2013) (“[The warrants] fail to 
set out any limits on the government’s review of the potentially large amount of electronic 
communications and information obtained from the electronic communications service providers.”); 
In re Search Warrants for Info. Associated with Target Email Address, Nos. 12-MJ-8119-DJW, 12-
MJ-8191-DJW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138465, at *29 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2012) (“[T]he Court is 
concerned by the lack of any limits on the government’s review of the information, such as filtering 
procedures for emails, faxes, and information that do not fall within the scope of probable cause or 
contain attorney-client privileged communications.”).   
 203.  In re Search of Info. Associated with @mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d 145, 149 (D.D.C. 2014), 
vacated, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he government failed to explain what would occur 
with data that were seized but were outside the scope of the warrant application . . . .” (citing In re 
Search of Info. Associated with @mac.com, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2014), renewed application 
denied, 13 F. Supp. 3d 157 (D.D.C. 2014))).   
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1. Affirmative Limitations Narrowing the Scope of the Search 
Where possible and reasonable, the government should take steps to 
limit the initial disclosures made by an entity holding a user’s electronic 
information.  The difficulty of establishing probable cause for the 
entirety of electronic information in an account should not preclude 
agents from executing a warrant.  However, the government and the 
reviewing magistrate judge must be cognizant of the potential for 
information outside that for which probable cause is established to be 
disclosed in a search warrant utilizing Rule 41’s two-step process. 
In In re Search Warrants for Information Associated with Target 
Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, the government requested an unlimited 
amount of information, but declared only information from June 2006 
onward would be retained.
204
  Although it is unclear due to the brief 
nature of the opinion, the government presumably had reason to believe 
that the alleged conspiracy, or use of electronic services to carry out the 
conspiracy, started in June 2006.
205
  Therefore, any information prior to 
June 2006 is seemingly not relevant to the government’s investigation.  
Despite this, the government’s request did not limit their request to a 
certain time period, instead they requested everything ever associated 
with the user’s account.
206
  Investigators may immediately disregard any 
information disclosed that is prior to June 2006, and service providers 
can easily limit the information it delivers to investigators.  Such a 
process ensures the government obtains information relevant to its 
investigation but also ensures that a potentially large amount of 
information from the user’s account for which the government has no 
probable cause is not disclosed.  A magistrate judge is well positioned to 
add this simple limitation.  Though limiting the request in this manner 
may also exclude information the user entered when registering for the 
service, there is nothing to preclude investigators from seeking that 
information by sufficiently identifying a need in its efforts to obtain 
further information on the suspect.  However, the government should not 
acquire information on a suspect when it fails to establish a fair 
probability that the criminal activity was occurring within the time period 
of requested disclosure. 
                                                          
 204.  In re Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123129, at *2–5. 
 205.  Id. at *4 (noting that the government warrant request included information “from June 
2006, when the conspiracy commenced”).   
 206.  Id. at *2–5.   
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2. Affirmative Limitations Narrowing the Type of Information 
Additionally, magistrate judges should not hesitate to modify the 
type of information disclosed if doing so ensures the government does 
not receive disclosures without fairly establishing probable cause.  
Following a deadly shooting at the Federal Navy Yard in Washington, 
D.C., government investigators requested a search warrant for the alleged 
shooter’s Facebook account.
207
  The government’s initial disclosure 
request was expansive in scope, involving every conceivable aspect of 
the suspect’s use of the social media site.
208
  In response to concerns 
about the scope of the warrant application, Judge Facciola limited the 
information Facebook must disclose.
209
  Importantly, the revised order 
limited the information to be disclosed to content the alleged shooter 
sent, excluding content of messages sent to the shooter from third parties 
and other third-party content and activities, such as photo “tags,” that the 
alleged shooter had no ability to control.
210
  As with a limitation on the 
time period, limiting the type of information disclosed is within a service 
provider’s technical abilities.  An affirmative limitation on the type of 
information disclosed is a great way to ensure that the government does 
not receive the entirety of an account, including information that is surely 
outside the warrant’s scope.  This limitation ensures that the government 
is more likely to receive information directly relevant to its investigation.  
Judicially imposed modifications and constraints on a search warrant 
application ensures that investigators search a set of information more 
closely tailored to that which it properly established probable cause. 
3. Filtering Agent or Special Master Limiting Disclosures to 
Investigators 
The use of a filtering agent or special master may be an acceptable 
limit on the government’s search of electronic information disclosed by 
providers.  In this procedure, the agent serves as a barrier to access for 
investigators that are involved in a particular case.  Rather than have an 
investigator search the information himself, the investigator works with 
an agent that is not directly involved in the investigation.
211
  This 
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technique can be helpful because investigators can repeatedly query the 
electronic information for clues, but the barrier to access limits the 
opportunity for an investigator involved in the case to view information 
that is not relevant to the investigation. 
In United States v. Bickle, the government used a filtering agent to 
conduct a search of the information disclosed by Microsoft.
212
  This 
practice served the additional purpose of ensuring the government did 
not view or search attorney-client privileged communications.
213
  
Additionally, the use of a government filtering agent or special master 
addresses concerns that an online-content provider may not be best suited 
to conduct an initial search if the court were to require a third-party 
provider to conduct an initial search of the suspect’s account before 
disclosing information to government investigators.
214
  Such a procedure 
implements an additional step in the investigative process, but the 
additional protections ensure that the government is able to obtain the 
information it needs while still protecting users’ Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
4. Affirmative Limitation on Retention of Disclosed Information 
Another troubling aspect to government investigations using Rule 
41’s two-step process is the lack of limitations on how long the 
government may retain information that is disclosed pursuant to a search 
warrant.  The indefinite retention of information in this manner is 
unreasonable because the government may repeatedly search the 
information without court oversight.  Currently, Rule 41 does not require 
limitations on the government’s retention and use of electronic 
information following an initial disclosure by a provider.
215
  The 2009 
Advisory Committee Notes simply declined “to arbitrarily set a 
presumptive time period” for return of materials.
216
  Additionally, several 
courts hold it unnecessary that the court impose or require a search 
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protocol or retention timeframe for information seized pursuant to a 
search warrant.
217
  However, magistrate judges should set a timeframe in 
which the government must destroy or return information outside the 
scope of the warrant.  A limit on the length of time the government 
retains any information it receives ensures that the government cannot 
access the information again. 
Judge Gorenstein argued that such a deadline could impede 
government investigations when the government must conduct additional 
searches after discovering new information in its investigation or must 
preserve information for trial purposes.
218
  Although the suggestion to 
seal information outside the scope of the warrant was suggested in In re 
Search of Information Associated with @mac.com, the suggestion 
mistakenly relied on precedent relating to on-site searches.
219
  Instead, 
Judge Facciola held the suggestion unacceptable.
220
  Rather than retain 
the information, it is reasonable to require the government to return the 
seized information, or destroy it. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rule 41 must be updated in light of the government’s search and 
seizure process for electronic information in the possession of an online 
service provider.  The Fourth Amendment must be applied with strength 
to protect Americans’ electronic information to ensure protections from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  As more investigations request 
electronic information from service providers, magistrate judges should 
impose affirmative limitations on the government’s conduct.  While Rule 
41’s two-step process is likely to continue to allow disclosure of a large 
universe of information in any given investigation, affirmative 
limitations can ensure the Fourth Amendment remains a strong 
protection in the digital era.  The affirmative limitations in this Comment 
provide concrete actions magistrate judges can take to ensure search 
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